Once someone has sued another and the case is dismissed, the plaintiff’s claim is barred or precluded. In Manko v Gabay, 175 AD3d 484 [2d Dept 2019], the court held:
The plaintiff subsequently commenced the instant action against, among others, the Gabay defendants, asserting causes of action against them, inter alia, to recover damages for legal malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty. The Gabay defendants moved, inter alia, pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(5) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against them. The Supreme Court granted that branch of the motion, and the plaintiff appeals.
We agree with the Supreme Court’s determination to grant that branch of the Gabay defendants’ motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(5) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against them as barred by the doctrine of res judicata, based upon the dismissal, on the merits, of the complaints insofar as asserted against them in the four prior actions. Under the doctrine of res judicata, or claim preclusion, “a valid final judgment bars future actions between the same parties on the same cause of action” (Parker v. Blauvelt Volunteer Fire Co., 93 N.Y.2d 343, 347, 690 N.Y.S.2d 478, 712 N.E.2d 647). “[O]nce a claim is brought to a final conclusion, all other claims arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions are barred, even if based upon different theories or if seeking a different remedy” (O’Brien v. City of Syracuse, 54 N.Y.2d 353, 357, 445 N.Y.S.2d 687, 429 N.E.2d 1158).
This Court takes a “pragmatic approach” to determining what constitutes a single transaction or series of transactions for the purposes of res judicata (Coliseum Towers Assoc. v. County of Nassau, 217 A.D.2d 387, 390, 637 N.Y.S.2d 972). Thus, events are part of the same transaction or series of transactions where their “foundational facts” are related in “time, space, origin, or motivation,” where they “form a convenient trial unit,” and where “treatment [of the foundational facts] as a unit conforms to the parties’ expectations” (id. at 390–391, 637 N.Y.S.2d 972 [internal quotation marks omitted] ).
The doctrine of collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, is “a component of the broader doctrine of res judicata which holds that, as to the parties in a litigation and those in privity with them, a judgment on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the issues of fact and questions of law necessarily decided therein in any subsequent action” ( *133 Gramatan Home Invs. Corp. v. Lopez, 46 N.Y.2d 481, 485, 414 N.Y.S.2d 308, 386 N.E.2d 1328). Collateral estoppel will bar relitigation of an issue where “the issue in the second action is identical to an issue which was raised, necessarily decided and material in the first action, and the plaintiff had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the earlier action” (Parker v. Blauvelt Volunteer Fire Co., 93 N.Y.2d at 349, 690 N.Y.S.2d 478, 712 N.E.2d 647; see Jeffreys v. Griffin, 1 N.Y.3d 34, 39, 769 N.Y.S.2d 184, 801 N.E.2d 404; Pinnacle Consultants v. Leucadia Natl. Corp., 94 N.Y.2d 426, 432, 706 N.Y.S.2d 46, 727 N.E.2d 543).
Here, the complaints in the four prior actions commenced by the plaintiff against the Gabay defendants were all dismissed insofar as asserted against them on the merits pursuant to the order dated May 7, 2012. The claims asserted in the instant action arise from the same transaction or series of transactions that gave rise to the four prior actions, i.e., the legal assistance provided by Gabay to the plaintiff from November 2007 to December 2007. The majority of the facts alleged in the five complaints are nearly identical, with the only differences being additional causes of action asserted in this action and different entities named as defendants of which Gabay is a principal, differences which nonetheless relate “in time, space, origin [and] motivation” to the claims adjudicated in the four prior actions (Xiao Yang Chen v. Fischer, 6 N.Y.3d 94, 100, 810 N.Y.S.2d 96, 843 N.E.2d 723 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Smith v. Russell Sage Coll., 54 N.Y.2d 185, 192–193, 445 N.Y.S.2d 68, 429 N.E.2d 746). Inasmuch as all issues related to the plaintiff’s claims sounding in simple legal malpractice were fully and finally decided in the four prior actions, they are barred by principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel (see Kret v. Brookdale Hosp. Med. Ctr., 61 N.Y.2d 861, 863, 473 N.Y.S.2d 970, 462 N.E.2d 147; see also Altamore v. Friedman, 193 A.D.2d 240, 244–245, 602 N.Y.S.2d 894). The plaintiff’s additional causes of action alleging, among other things, deprivation of constitutional rights and conspiracy “could have been raised in the prior litigation” and, consequently, are precluded by the doctrine of res judicata (Matter of Hunter, 4 N.Y.3d 260, 269, 794 N.Y.S.2d 286, 827 N.E.2d 269; see Rowley, Forrest, O’Donnell & Beaumont, P.C. v. Beechnut Nutrition Corp., 55 A.D.3d 982, 984, 865 N.Y.S.2d 390).
