In an action brought by a client against his law firm, the appellate court reversed the granting of the law firm’s motion for summary judgment based upon an issue of fact concerning the continuous representation doctrine.
Under the continuous representation doctrine, a person seeking professional assistance is placed in a difficult position if required to sue his or her attorney while the attorney continues to represent them on a particular legal matter (Shumsky v. Eisenstein, 96 N.Y.2d 164, 167–168, 726 N.Y.S.2d 365, 750 N.E.2d 67  ). Accordingly, the doctrine tolls the running of the statute of limitations on malpractice claims until the ongoing representation is completed (id.). However, the application of this doctrine is limited “to the course of representation concerning a specific legal matter,” and is not applicable to the client’s “continuing general relationship with a lawyer … involving only routine contact for miscellaneous legal representation … unrelated to the matter upon which the allegations of malpractice are predicated” (id. at 168, 726 N.Y.S.2d 365, 750 N.E.2d 67). The record presents an issue of fact as to whether defendant continuously represented plaintiff in connection with a personal injury claim based on the accident, such as to toll the statute of limitations during that time (see Glamm v. Allen, 57 N.Y.2d 87, 94, 453 N.Y.S.2d 674, 439 N.E.2d 390 ; Waggoner v. Caruso, 68 A.D.3d 1, 6–7, 886 N.Y.S.2d 368 [1st Dept. 2009] ). Encalada v McCarthy, Chachanover & Rosado, LLP, 160 AD3d 475 [1st Dept 2018].